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One of the most distinctive features of health coverage in the U.S. is the strong link between 
health insurance and employment. With few pooling mechanisms available for insurance 
purchase outside of the workplace and strong tax incentives to acquire coverage at work, most 
individuals and families rely on group coverage sponsored by their employers.  According to the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (March 
Demographic Supplement) in 2004, 68.6 percent of U.S. residents are covered by private health 
insurance and 88 percent of those obtain their insurance through their own employment or the 
employment of a family member.  Thus, employer-sponsored insurance is the main source of 
private coverage in the U.S. 
  Attempting to build upon this foundation, federal and state policymakers have viewed 
mandating private employment-based health insurance as a mechanism to further increase the 
proportion of the population covered while limiting direct public expenditures.  The Clinton 
Administration looked upon an employer mandate as a key feature in a universal coverage 
scheme (The White House Domestic Policy Council 1993).  More recently, California 
policymakers, through the Health Insurance Act of 1993 (Senate Bill 2), attempted to expand 
coverage by mandating employers to provide health insurance (California HealthCare 
Foundation 2004; Butler 2004; Kapur, Marquis and Taylor 2004; Sinaiko 2004).  Many other 
states have also floated various proposals to expand the employment-based health insurance 
system through mandates (Oliver 2004).  Failing to overcome divergent political and economic 
interests, none of these proposals have been fully implemented.  Furthermore, the states face an 
added regulatory hurdle in the form of the federal Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act 
(ERISA), which preempts state law and severely curtails the states’ abilities to mandate health 
and retirement benefits on an employer-wide basis (Chirba-Martin and Brenan 1994). As a result,   2
Hawaii’s Prepaid Health Care Act (PHCA) of 1974, which is sustained through a Congressional 
ERISA exemption, remains the only employer mandate in the nation.  We exploit the unique 
nature of the Hawaii law to discover the effect of mandating employer-sponsored insurance by 
use of a quasi-experimental method which treats the other 49 States and the District of Columbia 
as “controls”. 
The link between health insurance and employment has a very important implication for 
the functioning of the U.S. health insurance system and labor market. Gruber (2000) and Currie 
and Madrian (1999) carefully review dozens of studies that have addressed the effect of 
employer-provided health insurance on labor market outcomes. While this literature has 
convincingly addressed the effect of employer-provided heath insurance on wages, job turnover, 
and employment, there are several important holes in the literature that remain.  Although 
partially addressed (Dick 1994), one largely ignored question is whether state-mandated 
employer-provided health insurance is actually an effective tool to increase health insurance 
coverage.  Perhaps more importantly, no research to date has focused on how the state-mandated 
employer-provided health insurance has affected the coverage of other types of insurance, such 
as publicly provided health insurance.  Another under-researched, yet very important, question is 
the effect of state-mandated programs on the use of part-time workers.  
Hawaii’s mandated employer-provided health insurance system is best case-study to 
examine these issues. In 1974, the Hawaii state legislature passed the Prepaid Health Care Act 
(PHCA) which requires private-sector employers to provide health insurance to full-time 
workers (i.e., 20 or more hours per week) employed for at least four consecutive weeks. 
However, the Hawaii state law was subject to a series of court challenges following the 
enactment of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by the U.S. Congress.   3
Initially, the courts ruled that ERISA preempted PHCA, but in 1983 Congress passed an 
exemption that allowed PHCA to take effect with limited future amendments to the act. Largely 
due to the preemption of ERISA, no other state has implemented mandatory employer-provided 
health insurance to date.  
The study examines the impact of Hawaii’s mandatory employer-provided health 
insurance on insurance coverage and employment structure in Hawaii. Our model-based results 
indicate that employer-based coverage is higher in Hawaii than in the rest of the U.S. only for 
workers who are employed more than 20 hours a week. At the same time, there is a clear result 
that the percentage of workers covered by employer-provided insurance is lower than the U.S. as 
a whole for those working less than 20 hours. However, those who are working less than 20 
hours in Hawaii are much more likely to rely on publicly provided health insurance or military 
coverage than their counterparts in the other 49 states and the District of Columbia. As a 
consequence, the overall uninsured rate is lower in Hawaii than the rate in the U.S, regardless of 
hours worked. There is also avoidance of the employer-mandate in Hawaii by skirting the 20 
hour rule, which changes the distribution of employment. 
 
The Model and Data 
Employer-provided insurance is attractive for at least three reasons. First, group coverage at 
work typically has lower administrative costs as employers process and maintain employee 
informational records as a matter of general business practice for variety of purposes.  This 
generates economies of scope and economies of scale in insurance pool formation, which in turn 
renders low marginal cost of coverage.  Second, employer-provided group coverage is less likely 
to be subject to adverse selection as the group is formed for a primary reason other than the   4
purchase of health insurance.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the favorable tax-treatment 
of employer-provided health insurance provides a substantial subsidy to the purchase of coverage 
at work (Gruber 2002, 2000; Gruber and Poterba 1994; Pauly 1986; Feldstein and Friedman 
1977). Together these various phenomena generate low effective premiums and provide a 
powerful incentive to obtain health insurance coverage at work. However, imposing mandatory 
employer-provided health insurance might well be paid for by workers in the form of lower 
future wage increases or by firms in higher labor costs, as voluntary transactions will have 
already exploited potential mutual gains. Workers might also place different value on employer-
provided health insurance, depending on their preference, demographic characteristics, and level 
of earnings. Consider the following model. 
Following Gruber and Krueger (1991), we assume that labor demand (Ld) for and supply 











where W is wages, C insurance costs, and αC is the monetary value that a worker places on 
employer-provided health insurance. Imposing the market equlibrium condition on the equations 
in (1) and totally differentiating with respect to W and C renders the following expression. 
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where W
e is original equilibrium wage for full-time workers. Thus, the change in wage and 
employment after implementation of the PHCA depends on α given 
s and 
d η η . If α=1, the 
wage will fall by exactly same amount as the fixed cost (health insurance) rise, with no effect on 
employment. If α>1, then full-time employment could even rise. If 0<α<1, then the reduction in 
wages will be less than the increase in costs; i.e., employers cannot fully shift the insurance cost 
to wages. Thus, employers tend to replace full-time workers with their (uninsured) part-time 
counterpart, leading to a decrease in employment for full-time workers. In practice, employers 
may not be able to fully shift the insurance cost to wages due to other market imperfections, such 
as minumum wage laws or union’s resistance.
1 
In order to simplify our model we assume that there is no other publicly provided welfare 
program other than publicly provided health insurance. We further assume that the value of 
employer-provided health insurance is same as the value of publicly provided health insurance 
and employers cannot fully shift the insurance cost to wages. If there is an excess supply of labor 
for full-time employment after the imposition of PHCA, then some workers might move to part-
time labor markets
2.   In our framework, workers face three prominent choices: i) working part-
time and receiving publicly provided health insurance if they are eligible, ii) working full-time 
and receiving employer-provided health insurance, or iii) working part-time without health 
insurance. 
  Figures 1 and 2 summarize our main cases of insurance coverage using a exposition 
based on simple consumer theory with work-leisure choice. Because voluntary labor-market 
                                                 
1 Currie and Madrian (1999) note that the empirical validity of the shifting the insurance cost to wages had been 
difficult to establish in part because of the fact that firms paying high wages are also more likely to offer good 
benefit packages. Using an instrument variables estimation, however, Olson (2002) finds that employers are able to 
shift some insurance cost to wages, suggesting that there is a trade-off between wage and insurance provision. 
2 These people could also become self-employed or drop out of the labor market. These cases are not considered in 
our graphical model.   6
contracts will have already satisfied most workers’ desires for compenstion in the form of health 
insurance, we only consider the case in which employers cannot fully shift the insurance cost to 
wages. The original budget constraint without any health insurance is given by a straight line 
segment AA’. The publicly and the state-mandated employer-provided health insurance create 
two notches in this budget constraint for some workers. With less than H1 hours of work (part-
time), the worker receives publicly provided health insurance, which is a dominated part of the 
budget constraint. Many readers will recognize this is an adaption of Yelowitz’s so-called 
Medicaid notch (Yelowitz 1995; Gruber 2000; Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005). The worker will 
lose the publicly provided benefit if the worker works more than H1 hours and thereby the 
person’s income is above the eiligible state poverty line. The worker is eligible for state-
mandated employer-provided health insurance program if he works more than H2 hours (full-
time), which we call PHCA notch.  
<Figures 1 and 2 about here> 
Individuals choose a point along the budget constraint with these two notches. In practice, 
the size of two notches as well as an individual’s preference affects the choice of the worker. 
There are several possibilities. If α is close to 1, then the PHCA notch is small, and thus the 
employer can almost fully shift the fixed cost to wages. The worker has little incentive to change 
his behavior after the implementation of the PHCA. If this is the case, then the PHCA does not 
affect the percentage of people covered by publicly provided health insurance, although it may 
increase the percentage of people covered by employer-provided health insurance. Alternatively, 
if the worker voluntarily chooses to be a part-time worker both before and after the PHCA and 
relies on eligible publicly provided health insurance, then again the PHCA does not affect the   7
percentage of people covered by publicly provided health insurance. This is the case, illustrated 
in Figure 1.  
In Figure 2, the represented worker maximizes utility as a full-time worker before the 
implementation of the PHCA along the budget segment A’E. After the implementaion of the 
PHCA, some workers will achieve full-time employment with ESI and be able to optimize along 
the segment GF. This however, raises the effective cost to frims which in turn reduces the 
demand for full-time workers. As a result some workers will be rationed by the market and only 
be able to match with a part-time jobs, achieving utility I’, as the illustrated boundary solution 
indicates. Thus, the PHCA may increase the percentage of  part-time workers covered by 
publicly provided health insurance. That is, those who are unable to find full-time jobs with 
employer-provided health insurance may switch to publicly provided health insurance with part-
time jobs. A third case is (not shown in figures), although it is less likely, that, depending on the 
size of notch and shape of the indifference curve, some part-time workers who are eligible for 
publicly provided health insurance choose along the segment DE, losing both publicly-provided 
and employer-provided health insurance.  
Based on our two-notch model, the effect of the PHCA on the health insurance coverage 
and employment structure can be summarized as follows. First, it might increase the health 
insurance coverage for full-time workers. Second, there might be changes in the distribution of 
health insurance by hours worked due to employers’ eligibility avoidance. Third, some people 
who are unable to find full-time jobs with health insurance will switch to other types of insurance, 
such as publicly provided health insurance. 
Some literature is of relevance to our present work, but the number of studies is quite 
limited and the results are mixed. Gruber (1994a, 1994b) finds no significant effect of state-  8
mandated maternity benefits on employment, which also offers evidence to support the view of 
full shifting the cost of insurance to wages. Galloway (1995) and Scott, Berger, and Black (1989) 
find a positive relationship between the share of fringe benefits in compensation and the fraction 
of part-time workers, while Ehrenberg, Rosenberg, and Li (1988) find no effect of variations in 
the eligibility of part-time workers for benefits on the use of part-time workers. While 
Buchmueller (1999) finds that an increase in the fringe benefits for full-time employees increases 
the share of part-time workers employed, Montgomery and Cosgrove (1993) find that increases 
in benefits decrease the share of hours in their sample of childcare centers that are worked by 
part-time workers.  These studies generally look at US data. 
In one of the few studies to focus on Hawaii, Thurston (1997) shows that Hawaii has 
significantly higher rates of persons covered by employer-provided insurance as compared to the 
U.S. as a whole.  Perhaps even more interesting, he finds a substantial coat-tail effect that implies 
a 1-to-1 spillover effect from full time workers (working at least 20 hours per week) to part-time 
workers (working less than 20 hours); i.e., he finds that even though part-time workers are 
excluded from the PHCA, approximately 11% more part-time workers in Hawaii have employer-
provided health insurance than in the U.S. as a whole. However, he only compares the mean 
values of employer-provided health insurance coverage and working hours between Hawaii and 
U.S.
 3 This might be problematic because Hawaii has unique demographics and industrial 
structure which may have affected health insurance rates in the absence of state-mandated 
programs. Nor does he consider the effect of the state-mandated health program on other 
                                                 
3 This is also true for some other evidences. Although there are some studies which discuss the effect of the PHCA 
on insurance coverage, they just compare the mean of the percentage insured in Hawaii with those in other states, 
even without distinguishing full-time from part-time workers. The results are also mixed. While Lewin and 
Sybinsky (1993) and Neubauer (1993) claim that PHCA might be an effective tool in increasing insurance coverage 
rate, Dick (1994) argues that the PHCA has little impact on employer-provided health insurance coverage simply 
because it does not target a large portion of the uninsured.   9
insurance such as publicly provided insurance. Little systematic effort has been made to assess 
his results to date. 
We test our hypothesis using the Current Population Survey (CPS) March Demographic 
Supplement for the years 1994-2004, which is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.
4 Among 
the sample, we select persons aged 19-64 years who are employed, but not self-employed. The 
total number of observations used in our sample is 7,228 for Hawaii and 622,877 for U.S. as a 
whole. We measure an insurance status which indicates whether a person had any type of health 
insurance during last year at any point in time (even for one day). Dental and vision coverage are 
excluded under the CPS definition of health insurance. The number of hours worked is measured 
as the usual hours of work at the main job held last week. 
Ideally an analysis would include random samples of the Hawaiian population both 
before and after the PHCA implemenation, January 1975. Such data simply does not exist.
5 As 
an alternative, we analyze the performance of Hawaiian system after implementation of the 
PHCA relative to other states and U.S. as a whole and conduct counter-factual analyses. If we 
view the provision of the state-mandated employer-provided health insurance in Hawaii as a 
constraint model relative to U.S. nationwide, it follows that at least some of the deviations from 
the U.S. outcomes might imply the effect of the PHCA. We not only compare Hawaii with U.S., 
but we compare it with selected other states. We select four comparative states in all (Nevada, 
                                                 
4 Although the information on health insurance becomes available a few years before 1994, we only use data since 
1994 because the phase-in new sample started in 1994. We found that there are some inconsistencies in variables 
before and after 1994.   
5 The CPS does not include health insurance coverage information prior to 1980, nor was it identified Hawaii from 
other states in any of the pre-program years. To show how wage and health insurance coverage has changed before 
and after the PHCA, Thurston (1997) tries to use 1970 Census data and 1969 hospital enrollment data and compare 
it with CPS 1990-93. However, any two numbers before and after the PHCA were not directly comparable. 
Unfortunately, there is a substantial difference in numbers between self-reported survey data and estimates based on 
hospital enrollment data which Thurston used. Furthermore, only bracketed working hours and weeks worked are 
reported in the 1970 Census, preventing us making any direct comparisons between CPS and the Census for our 
purpose.    10
Michigan, California, and Florida), ranging from one with a very similar industrial structure to 
that of  Hawaii (Nevada), to another which is most divergent (Michigan) to compare the results. 
   We assume that the selection of workers into each type of insurance has the structure of a 
















where Ii is an indicator of each worker’s type of insurance, and Z is the set of variables in the 
multinomial logit equation. The dependent variable is essentially a categorical probability that a 
person with specific characteristic will end up in a particular category.  The model predicted over 
three categories: uninsured, employer-provided insurance, and other insurance.
6,7 The 
independent variables of baseline specification include age of an individual, sex, ratio of 
household income to state poverty line and its squared term, hours worked, education, race, 14 
dummy variables for type of industry in which the worker is employed, marital status, 
establishment size, and the presence of a collective bargaining agreement. All estimates in this 
paper were obtained using the consistent variance-covariance matrix estimator of White (1980). 
The standard errors are thus robust to heteroskedasticity. The March Supplement final weight, 
which is the product of several adjustments of the CPS, is used to produce population estimates 
for the various estimates. After estimation, we conduct counter-factual analysis. For example, we 
measure what would be the insurance coverage by type of insurance of Hawaii and other states if 
                                                 
6 Other insurance includes Medicaid, Medicare, CHAMPUS/Tricare, private non-group coverage, and other forms of 
public and private insurance. 
7 There are some people who are covered by two or even three different insurance. We tried to separate or drop this 
group, but it barely affected results. We also tried four categorical model, i.e., i) uninsured, ii) employer-provided, iii) 
publicly provided, and iv) others (other private insurance). The results are qualitatively same, and the results are not 
reported here.    11
they have same socio-economic and demographic characteristics. We predict the effect of hours 
worked on the probability of coverage holding other variables constant. 
Table 1 present the percentage of insured by type of insurance for five states and U.S. as 
a whole. 15.6 percent of the U.S. population had no health insurance in survey year 2004. Hawaii 
(10.1%) and Michigan (10.9%) have much less uninsured than U.S. as a whole, while Nevada 
(18.9%), California (18.4%), and Florida (18.2%) are characterized by much higher percentage 
of uninsured in year 2004. The 11-year average shows very similar pattern as well. The table also 
clearly indicates that the coverage of insurance by type of insurance is very different across 
states. For example, Hawaii is characterized by a high percentage of CHAMPUS/TRICARE 
coverage due to a large proportion of active duty military personnel, retirees and military 
dependents. Thus, it is necessary to take this into consideration, for example by doing analysis, 
first with CHAMPUS/TRICARE and then without it. The table also shows a higher percentage 
of employment based health insurance for Hawaii and Michigan. However, we cannot draw any 
rigorous conclusions based on these summarized data. What our model should predict is an 
effect of PHCA notch, but the insurance coverage depends on several other factors such as age 
structure, income distribution, industry structure, and many other factors which previous studies 
also neglected. To gain better insight, therefore, we turn to regression results discussed in the 
next section.  
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Evidence on Insurance Coverage 
Since the goal of the PHCA was to reduce the number of uninsured in the state of Hawaii, it is 
necessary to analyze insurance rates to determine whether it has been an effective tool or not. For   12
this purpose, we run regressions using samples from Hawaii, Nevada, Michigan, California, 
Florida, and the U.S., and compare the results. Our multinomial logit results are presented in 
Table 2 where the base category is the uninsured. The coefficients are presented as relative risk 
ratios. For example, the coefficient of male dummy in the employer-provided health insurance in 
Hawaii sample is 0.709 suggesting that the odd of having employer-provided health insurance 
over being uninsured (base category) is 0.709 for male workers relative to female workers. Most 
variables in all categories are significant at the 5% significant level. The regression coefficient of 
working hours is especially significant in all samples. This suggests that working hours is a 
strong predictor of the type of insurance.  
<Table 2 about here> 
  Using 5-hour ranges for hours worked, the counterfactual analysis predicts that the 
insurance coverage of Hawaii is higher than that the rest of the U.S. in general (Figure 3). This 
appears to support Thurston’s contention that there are positive spillovers (coat-tail effect) to 
workers employed for less than 20 hours per week. However, when we looked at the predicted 
percentage of workers covered only under employer-provided insurance, we see somewhat 
different pattern (Figure 4. See Figure A1 for graph using single hours worked). There is a clear 
trend that the percentage of workers covered by employer-provided insurance in Hawaii is in fact 
lower than the U.S. and other states for workers working less than 20 hours.  At the same time, 
for all workers over 20 hours, the model predicts levels of employer-based insurance coverage 
that are higher in Hawaii than in the U.S.  If the positive spillovers that Thurston suggests exist, 
one would think that they would largely appear in the predictions of employer-provided 
insurance.  Since this is not the case, this casts doubt on the claim for positive spillovers to part-
time employees.   13
<Figures 3 and 4 about here> 
To see why this is the case, we predict the percentage of other insurance. The result is 
somewhat striking (Figure 5. Figure A2 for single hours worked). Those who are working less 
than 20 hours in Hawaii are much more likely to rely on the other types of insurances, especially 
publicly provided health insurance than in the rest of the U.S. That is, our evidence suggests that 
the lower rate of uninsurance of part-time workers in Hawaii is not due to the spillover effect. On 
the contrary, it is because people who could not find a full-time job have switched to the other 
types of insurance, such as publicly provided health insurance.  
<Figure 5 about here> 
Our method for discerning the impact of the PHCA is to compare the probability of being 
covered by employer-provided health insurance in Hawaii with the probabilities of being covered 
in the U.S. and selected states.  In making our comparison we control for characteristics of the 
workforce and labor market including age, sex, education, marital status, race, income, hours-
worked, size of establishment, industrial structure and collective bargaining.  The remaining 
difference we infer is due to the presence of the PHCA employer-mandate, as Hawaii is the only 
state in the U.S. to have such a mandate.  Our method, therefore, is essentially a residual method, 
which we often employ to calculate wage differential between men and women or between union 
and non-union members. That is, we infer the residual difference is due to the PHCA, assuming 
other things are held constant.  If our maintained hypothesis, that other factors have been 
properly controlled, is false, our results may bias the estimated impact of the PHCA.  
One possible source of major structural difference between Hawaii and the U.S. overall is 
the presence of a disproportionately large military complex including all branches of the U.S. 
military services with combat units, support units & facilities, and command & control   14
infrastructure. This has significant impacts on the Hawaii economy, labor market, health delivery 
system and insurance coverage.  While 3-4% of the population nationwide is covered by military 
health insurance through CHAMPUS/TRICARE, 8-9% of the Hawaii population is so covered.  
Perhaps this explains the effects we observe, rather than PHCA.    
To see if our results are possibly driven by this structural difference, we re-estimate our 
models omitting all observations relating to military health insurance.  The results are essentially 
unchanged further strengthening our conclusion that the PHCA increases coverage for full-time 
workers and decreasing employer-provided insurance coverage for part-time workers (Figure 
A3). We believe, however, that the large presence of CHAMPUS/TRICARE in Hawaii is part of 
the PHCA labor market interactions and our preferred model includes these observations. For 
example, military spouses are more likely to accept part-time private-sector employment without 
health insurance, but with higher cash wages in the knowledge that they can draw upon family 
coverage through TRICARE.  It is this type of equilibrium response we believe our model 
captures. 
In addition to our model variants with and without CHAMPUS/TRICARE beneficiaries, 
we conduct three other sensitivity checks to confirm the robustness of our results.  First, we 
utilize two questions from the CPS on the number of hours worked per week—usual hours 
worked per week at all jobs held last year and last week.  Second, we simulate the counterfactual 
estimates with the Hawaii means and overall U.S. means.  Finally, we simulate the 
counterfactual estimates using Caucasian sample only, excluding Asian and Pacific Islanders. All 
results are quite robust to the hours measured used, choice of mean, and sub-group of sample   15
(e.g. Figure A4). These additional checks confirm our conclusions are based on real underlying 
phenomenon and not mere remnants of the specification or particular data values employed.
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Evidence on Labor Force Utilization 
One way in which the PHCA may impact the labor market in the state of Hawaii is by causing a 
sectoral shift of labor from full-time to part-time labor. The benefit of such a shift to employers 
is that part-time employees are exempt from the PHCA, thus reducing the employers’ insurance 
liability. Some results from the previous section, suggesting that insurance is lower than the U.S. 
for those who work less than or equal to 20 hours, is consistent with this view. One way to 
examine whether the PHCA has had an impact on full-time versus part-time labor markets in the 
economy is to compare the distribution of hours worked in Hawaii to those of the other states 
and the U.S. as a whole. Figure 6 presents a result for five states as well as the U.S. There 
appears to be a clear difference in the pattern of hours worked between Hawaii and other states.
9 
<Figure 6 about here> 
One might argue that businesses affiliated with the tourism industry in Hawaii are very 
different from that in other states, which is conducive to employing part-time labor. Again, the 
striking feature of the figure is that Nevada and Michigan, which respectively have the most 
similar and different industry structure as that of Hawaii, have very similar distributions of 
workers by hours worked. Their pattern is not different from the U.S. as a whole, either. 
Especially, the percentage of people working 16-19 hours is almost identical across state and in 
                                                 
8 Workers’ unobserved characteristics might be correlated with working hours. Working hours are not randomly 
assigned across the population; rather, individuals make their own choice of working hours.  Depending on how 
these choices are made, measured probability of specific type of insurance between workers with different working 
hours may bias the true probability. However, it might be very difficult to find compelling identifying assumptions 
in this case, and using irrelevant identifying variables does harm rather than does good (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 
1995). We left this issue for future studies. 
9In order to show the differences between Hawaii and the other states more clearly, we only report working hours 
less than 40. Because substantial percentage (50-60%) of workers report working hours at 40, adjusting scales of      16
the U.S., while it is in the spike in Hawaii. In addition, Hawaii appears to have higher percentage 
of employees at exactly 20 hour categories as well. Considering there is often a substantial 
reporting error due to rounding-off (reporting 20 hours when it is slightly less than 20 hours), 
some people in this group could also belong to 16-19 working hours group. This is indicative of 
employers in Hawaii employ more part-time workers not because of industry structure but 
because of employer’s effort to reduce cost by employing more part-time workers. 
This pattern of employment could be more dramatically seen by looking at the 
cumulative distribution of working hours (Figure 7). Again, there is small but clear difference 
between Hawaii and other states. However, there could be other exogenous factors that 
contributed to the spike of part-time workers in Hawaii. For example, Hawaii’s population is, on 
average, older than the U.S. average, so larger numbers of retirees who are covered by Medicare 
have little need for health insurance benefits. If elderly labor force is larger in Hawaii than in 
other states it would affect the distribution of working hours in Hawaii. To explore this issue, we 
redrew the Figure 6 using U.S. population age structure as a weight (not shown). Again, the 
results are not qualitatively different, implying that age structure in Hawaii is little to do with the 
pattern shown in Figure 6. 
<Figure 7 about here> 
Although the distribution of workers by hours worked indicates a disproportionate 
number of Hawaii workers in the vicinity of 20-hours per week, implying a PHCA effect, we 
may not draw a rigorous conclusion based on the summarized data.  Thus, we have constructed a 
matched sample to investigate the issue further.  Again using 11-years of the CPS 1994-2004, we 
selected 4,642 private-sector workers age 19-64 from the Hawaii sample who reported at least 
some hours at the main job.  We matched these observations on the basis of age (5-year   17
increments), sex, education, marital status, survey year (3-year increments), industry of 
employment and unionization with an equal number of selected observations from the other 49 
States and the District of Columbia.  If more than one match occurred, we randomly selected 
among the exact matches to generate an exactly balanced matched sample. 
Table 3 presents the tabulated distribution of workers by hours worked per week (1-19, 
20-35, 36+) split between those with ESI and those without based on these matched samples. 
Overall the results indicate labor market sorting between workers with ESI and workers without 
ESI, with more full-time with ESI and more part-time without.  This is the case for both the USA 
and Hawaii.  However, the evidence suggests that the PHCA is accentuating the differences 
between part-time and full-time. The results indicate that Hawaii has fewer workers with ESI, as 
a proportion of total private-sector workers, working 20-35 hours per week than the USA and 
more workers above 35 hours.  We hypothesize that the fixed-cost per worker nature of health 
insurance makes workers in the range 20-35 hours the most expensive.  For workers below 20 
hours, PHCA does not apply, so voluntary fringe benefit packages will arise.  For some workers 
above 20 hours, the PHCA will be a binding constraint, and firms will be forced to cover some 
workers who would not otherwise be covered.  As a consequence, it now becomes cheaper on the 
margin to increase the hours of existing full-time workers and substitute this time for the workers 
in the 20-35 range.  Similar results have been found by Cutler and Madrian (1998) with regard to 
rising premiums in the USA overall (i.e., rising premiums induced more full-time workers).  This 
in precisely the pattern we see in Table 3 with regard to PHCA.  However, we do not find that 
Hawaii has a disproportionate number of part-time workers (1-19 hours.)  Similar results are 
found when we look at all workers combined (i.e., public and private sector workers) (See Table 
4).  Results based on total labor utilization as measured by total hours worked (not shown)   18
rendered the same pattern.  That is, the PHCA has generated an increase in the utilization of 
labor coming from workers at 36+ hours and a decrease in the utilization of labor coming from 
workers in the 20-35 hour range, with a negligible impact on workers below 20 hours. 
<Table 3 and 4 about here> 
 
Conclusion 
The relationship between health insurance coverage and employment was the central concern of 
Clinton Administration’s proposed universal employer-provided mandated program. The debate 
is still on-going especially at the state level and the debate will certainly reappear in the near 
future. This paper tries to shed a light on the debate by examining the case of Hawaii’s state-
mandated employer-provided health insurance. 
The evidence in this paper suggests that levels of employer-based coverage are higher in 
Hawaii than in the rest of the U.S. for workers who are working more than 20 hours a week. At 
the same time, there is a clear indication that the percent of workers covered by employer-
provided insurance is lower than the U.S. for those who work less than or equal to 20 hours, 
suggesting that there might be substantial eligibility avoidance. However, those who are working 
less than 20 hours in Hawaii are much more likely to rely on other insurance such as publicly 
provided health insurance than in the rest of the U.S.  Our results also suggest that employer 
mandates has generated a decrease in the utilization of labor coming from workers in the 20-35 
working hour range. The results are robust after controlling the difference in industry structure 
and demographic characteristics across states. The estimation used in the paper relies on a 
residual method. One may even attribute everything we have observed to the use of residual   19
method itself. However, a more natural and simpler way to interpret the results is that the PHCA 
did have distinct effects on insurance coverage and distribution of workers by hours worked. 
The implication of our evidence on social welfare and economy is complex. Some studies 
claim that the mandate will be an efficient and equitable policy if the mandate is simply a means 
of financing (Gruber, 2000). Meanwhile, Thurston (1997) argues that there is a coat-tail effect of 
the mandate on part-time workers. However, our evidence suggests that eligibility avoidance of 
employers might offset the beneficial effect of mandate on government budget financing. Nor do 
our results suggest that the lower percentage of uninsurance of part-time workers in Hawaii is a 
coat-tail effect. 
Is there any other labor market related implication of the state mandate? One interesting 
research topic that we did not address here is to test so called “wife-lock” hypothesis (Gruber 
2000). Because the PHCA discourage double coverage and thereby dependent coverage, people 
have wondered that state-mandated health insurance such as the PHCA may encourage spouse’s 
labor force participation. This might be an interesting extension of this paper.   20
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Table 1. Insured and Uninsured by Types of Insurance: CPS 1994-2004 (%) 
                            
   Insured 
  Public     Private   
Year Medicare Medicaid
CHAMPUS/ 
TRICARE Sub-total ESI Sub-total
Insured 
Total Uninsured Total
U.S.    
1994 12.7 12.2 3.7 26.4 57.1 70.2 84.7 15.3 100.0
1995 12.9 12.1 4.3 26.8 60.9 70.3 84.8 15.2 100.0
1996 13.1 12.1 3.5 26.4 61.1 70.3 84.6 15.4 100.0
1997 13.2 11.8 3.3 25.9 61.2 70.2 84.4 15.6 100.0
1998 13.2 10.8 3.2 24.8 61.4 70.1 83.9 16.1 100.0
1999 13.2 10.3 3.2 24.3 62.0 70.2 83.7 16.3 100.0
2000 13.2 10.3 3.1 24.3 63.5 72.1 85.7 14.3 100.0
2001 13.4 10.3 3.0 24.2 64.1 72.4 86.0 14.0 100.0
2002 13.5 11.2 3.4 25.3 62.6 70.9 85.4 14.6 100.0
2003 13.4 11.6 3.5 25.7 61.3 69.6 84.8 15.2 100.0
2004 13.7 12.4 3.5 26.6 60.4 68.6 84.4 15.6 100.0
1994-2004 13.2 11.4 3.4 25.5 61.4 70.4 84.8 15.2 100.0
Hawaii                
1994 12.4 7.7 14.4 33.2 60.4 72.4 88.9 11.1 100.0
1995 14.3 9.5 13.8 34.2 67.4 74.8 90.9 9.1 100.0
1996 11.6 14.6 13.2 36.1 62.2 71.8 91.1 8.9 100.0
1997 12.3 14.3 12.4 36.1 60.5 69.1 91.4 8.6 100.0
1998 13.9 10.9 11.1 33.7 64.2 72.4 92.5 7.5 100.0
1999 13.4 10.4 9.2 31.5 69.3 74.6 90.0 10.0 100.0
2000 11.4 10.2 6.5 27.1 71.3 76.8 89.7 10.3 100.0
2001 13.2 10.5 5.6 26.5 68.4 77.7 89.9 10.1 100.0
2002 14.4 11.5 10.0 32.9 66.1 73.2 90.4 9.6 100.0
2003 14.1 10.5 8.5 30.2 67.6 73.5 90.0 10.0 100.0
2004 14.1 10.6 8.3 30.5 67.9 74.0 89.9 10.1 100.0
1994-2004 13.2 11.0 10.2 32.0 66.0 73.7 90.4 9.6 100.0
Nevada                
1994 11.7 5.9 6.2 21.7 60.9 72.6 81.9 18.1 100.0
1995 12.6 6.8 5.3 22.4 66.3 73.4 84.3 15.7 100.0
1996 13.3 8.9 4.2 22.4 64.0 71.4 81.3 18.7 100.0
1997 12.4 9.0 4.5 23.3 67.3 72.4 84.4 15.6 100.0
1998 13.1 6.7 5.1 22.3 64.2 72.7 82.5 17.5 100.0
1999 11.5 4.5 3.4 17.2 63.7 70.2 78.8 21.2 100.0
2000 11.9 6.2 3.5 19.6 62.7 70.8 81.7 18.3 100.0
2001 12.9 8.3 3.4 21.8 63.9 71.4 84.4 15.6 100.0
2002 11.8 6.3 4.1 19.4 67.1 72.8 83.9 16.1 100.0
2003 12.5 6.0 4.0 19.8 63.1 69.0 80.3 19.7 100.0
2004 12.4 8.3 4.0 21.5 60.7 67.5 81.1 18.9 100.0
1994-2004 12.4 7.0 4.3 20.9 63.9 71.1 82.2 17.8 100.0
Michigan                
1994 12.2 14.8 1.7 26.9 64.1 74.6 88.8 11.2 100.0
1995 13.1 13.7 3.2 28.0 68.4 76.2 89.2 10.8 100.0
1996 13.6 11.2 1.4 24.9 71.4 77.9 90.3 9.7 100.0 
1997 13.8 12.6 1.1 25.2 71.3 78.6 91.1 8.9 100.0
1998 13.9 12.8 1.3 25.7 68.3 75.7 88.4 11.6 100.0
1999 12.7 11.3 0.9 23.2 69.6 74.9 86.8 13.2 100.0
2000 12.3 10.3 1.0 21.8 71.5 78.6 89.9 10.1 100.0
2001 13.0 10.0 0.9 22.2 72.5 79.1 90.1 9.9 100.0
2002 14.0 10.1 1.2 23.5 72.3 78.2 89.6 10.4 100.0
2003 12.9 11.7 0.9 24.0 68.9 75.6 88.3 11.7 100.0
2004 14.1 12.7 1.4 25.8 69.0 76.2 89.1 10.9 100.0
1994-2004 13.2 11.9 1.3 24.6 69.8 76.9 89.2 10.8 100.0
California
1994 10.7 16.5 3.3 27.8 50.9 62.2 80.3 19.7100.0
1995 11.3 16.4 4.4 28.7 52.9 60.1 78.9 21.1100.0
1996 11.1 15.9 3.0 27.5 53.3 61.0 79.4 20.6100.0
1997 10.9 14.5 2.4 25.5 53.7 62.2 79.9 20.1100.0
1998 11.0 13.5 2.7 24.6 54.1 61.5 78.5 21.5100.0
1999 11.3 12.8 2.9 24.5 54.1 61.3 77.9 22.1100.0
2000 10.8 13.3 2.8 24.4 57.3 64.9 81.0 19.0100.0
2001 11.0 13.5 2.9 24.7 57.3 65.1 81.9 18.1100.0
2002 10.2 13.9 2.9 24.1 55.9 63.6 80.5 19.5100.0
2003 10.7 14.2 3.0 24.8 56.9 65.1 81.8 18.2100.0
2004 11.7 15.1 2.7 26.3 55.5 63.8 81.6 18.4100.0
1994-2004 11.0 14.5 3.0 25.7 54.8 62.9 80.2 19.8100.0
Florida                
1994 16.4 12.2 5.0 31.1 49.1 64.2 80.4 19.6100.0
1995 17.6 11.5 5.7 31.8 53.0 64.9 82.8 17.2100.0
1996 17.4 11.2 5.3 31.0 52.8 64.8 81.7 18.3100.0
1997 18.2 11.9 4.4 31.6 52.7 64.4 81.1 18.9100.0
1998 19.0 9.0 3.9 28.9 53.1 64.2 80.4 19.6100.0
1999 19.8 8.5 3.8 29.1 55.4 66.6 82.5 17.5100.0
2000 18.1 9.2 3.6 27.8 55.7 65.9 82.0 18.0100.0
2001 18.2 10.5 3.1 28.0 56.5 66.7 82.7 17.3100.0
2002 17.7 10.9 4.0 29.1 55.9 65.7 82.5 17.5100.0
2003 18.4 10.7 5.0 29.9 53.4 64.9 82.7 17.3100.0
2004 18.4 11.2 4.7 30.3 54.2 64.7 81.8 18.2100.0
1994-2004 18.1 10.6 4.4 29.9 53.8 65.2 81.9 18.1100.0
                             
Note: Weighted Tabulations. Year refers to CPS survey year.  
  
 
Table 2.  Multinomial Logit Results (Base=Uninsured), CPS 1994-2004 
                         
               
Status     U.S. Hawaii Nevada Michigan California Florida
                         
Employer sponsored              
 Age    1.049 1.015 1.066 1.033 1.056 1.056
     (16.62) (0.49) (3.19) (1.89) (6.12) (5.00)
 Age  squared    1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000
     (10.06) (0.34) (2.33) (0.93) (4.26) (3.47)
 Male    0.709 0.622 0.741 0.735 0.685 0.740
     (34.08) (4.77) (4.42) (5.26) (13.04) (7.70)
 Married    2.064 2.248 2.234 2.370 1.988 1.834
     (65.84) (6.48) (10.95) (12.89) (21.30) (14.19)
 College    1.623 1.140 1.616 1.529 1.786 1.578
     (45.62) (1.16) (6.26) (7.32) (17.75) (11.14)
 FPL    1.670 1.506 1.412 1.648 1.658 1.617
     (82.21) (8.07) (3.62) (15.98) (25.81) (19.55)
 FPL  squared    0.987 0.988 0.995 0.987 0.987 0.988
     (43.71) (5.58) (0.44) (9.71) (12.77) (9.50)
 Non-white    0.732 1.066 1.058 0.614 0.876 0.881
     (22.69) (0.49) (0.53) (6.51) (3.24) (2.31)
 Hours  Worked    1.012 1.040 1.019 1.008 1.017 1.019
     (22.21) (6.28) (3.93) (3.02) (9.43) (8.17)
 Union    2.193 3.240 2.286 1.859 1.966 1.703
     (20.50) (2.97) (3.44) (3.97) (6.10) (2.52)
 Firm  Size  (1-9)    0.271 0.402 0.247 0.302 0.239 0.277
     (90.31) (6.34) (12.93) (13.92) (33.68) (22.74)
 Firm  Size  (10-499)    0.609 0.860 0.517 0.727 0.560 0.522
     (45.30) (1.18) (8.63) (5.25) (17.78) (14.45)
Others                
 Age    0.916 1.024 0.864 0.907 0.954 0.918
     (21.55) (0.58) (4.19) (4.16) (3.79) (5.62)
 Age  squared    1.001 0.999 1.002 1.001 1.001 1.001
     (23.06) (1.04) (4.44) (4.25) (4.22) (6.20)
 Male    0.651 0.517 0.743 0.598 0.606 0.676
     (28.33) (4.74) (2.44) (6.00) (11.39) (6.85)
 Married    1.139 1.657 1.458 1.029 1.224 1.318
     (7.85) (3.05) (2.80) (0.28) (4.28) (4.46)
 College    1.661 0.876 2.177 1.348 1.596 1.567
     (33.03) (0.85) (5.53) (3.64) (10.01) (7.65)
 FPL    1.061 1.055 1.128 0.872 1.069 1.146
     (8.49) (0.91) (1.39) (2.98) (3.47) (5.10)
 FPL  squared    0.999 0.999 0.999 1.003 0.999 0.997
     (7.46) (0.63) (2.17) (3.47) (2.88) (4.66)
 Non-white    0.848 0.697 1.497 1.053 0.949 0.823
     (8.40) (2.15) (2.27) (0.51) (0.88) (2.50)
 Hours  Worked    0.977 0.977 0.984 0.966 0.974 0.978
     (31.35) (3.04) (1.70) (8.64) (11.27) (6.93) 
 Union    0.929 0.636 1.899 0.794 0.852 1.045
     (1.15) (0.79) (1.55) (0.95) (0.87) (0.13)
 Firm  Size  (1-9)    0.853 0.613 1.079 0.760 0.795 0.837
     (7.95) (2.53) (0.43) (2.28) (3.91) (2.31)
 Firm  Size  (10-499)    0.822 0.717 0.629 0.866 0.789 0.794
     (11.98) (1.96) (3.23) (1.63) (4.75) (3.50)
                         
Relative risk ratio form. t-values are in parenthesis. The underlined estimates are not significant at the 5%
level. All the other estimates are significant at the 5% level. Other variables include industry and year 




Table 3.  Percent Distribution of Private-Sector Workers by Hours-Worked, Hawaii 
and USA 1994-2004. 
Private Workers with ESI Private Workers without 
ESI 
All Private Workers  Hours 
per Week 
Hawaii USA  Hawaii  USA  Hawaii  USA 
1-19 2.39%  2.83%  13.29% 9.30% 4.07% 4.42% 
20-35  10.42%  12.33% 35.55% 28.90% 14.89% 16.42% 
36+  87.19%  84.84%  51.16% 61.79% 81.04% 79.17% 
Based on usual hours worked per week at main job. Highlighted values indicate differences 




Table 4.  Percent Distribution of Public-Sector and Private-Sector Workers 
Combined by Hours-Worked, Hawaii and USA 1994-2004. 
Workers with ESI  Workers without ESI  All Workers  Hours 
per Week 
Hawaii  USA Hawaii  USA Hawaii  USA 
1-19 2.96%  2.96% 14.19%  9.68% 4.94%  4.65% 
20-35  9.83%  11.61%  32.21%  25.45%  13.94%  15.49% 
36+  87.21%  85.40%  53.60%  64.86% 81.12%  79.86% 
Based on usual hours worked per week at main job. Highlighted values indicate differences 






Figure 1. A Two-Notch Budget Constraint for Hawaii Workers before and after the PHCA: 
               Voluntary Part-Time Workers with Publicly Provided Health Insurance 
 
Income      
Cost          G 
           A’          Employer-provided health insurance (=GZ) 
 
                                            
                Z 
                                                  
 
 
                                                F       
                                                         C            
                                                E                    
 
                                             Z’                        
                                                         D                           
                     
                                                                                                I  
               B  
                      
               Publicly  provided  insurance  (=AB) 
               
                                              H2        H1                       A        Leisure 
                                              20      Breakeven             0        Hours worked     
                        
 
  
Figure 2. A Two Notch Budget Constraint for Hawaii Workers before and after the PHCA: 
           Involuntary Part-Time Workers with Publicly Provided Health Insurance. 
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FLFigure A1. The effect of PHCA on the percent covered by employer-































FLFigure A2. The effect of PHCA on the percent covered by non-





























FLFigure A3. The effect of PHCA on the percent covered by employer-





























FLFigure A4. The effect of PHCA on the percent covered by employer-
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